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In recent years, decentralization has been upheld by governments, donors and policy makers in many
developing countries as a means of improving public services although opinion is divided on the link
between decentralization and service delivery. This article reviews recent literature and research on
decentralized service delivery in Tanzania. It uses the principal-agent theory and broader
decentralization frameworks to describe and compare decentralization in two sectors: water and health.
The analysis shows that decentralization between the two sectors differs, with the water sector
displaying a mixture of bottom-up and top-down models while the health sector is more centralized with
an orientation towards the top-down model. It is concluded that decentralized service delivery in
Tanzania takes on different forms where the nature of sector is an important factor in the kind of
institutional arrangements, in which gender plays a role as well.
Keywords: Decentralization, institutions, principal-agent theory, public services, Tanzania.
INTRODUCTION
Tanzania has undergone major decentralization reforms
over the past one decade through local government
reforms (LGRs) with an overall objective of improving the
quality, access and equitable delivery of public services
provided through or facilitated by local government
authorities (LGAs). Although decentralization has been
an important part of the development agenda for much of
the post-independence period, there are major variations
in the forms that decentralization has taken place. Earlier
attempts from the 1960s to mid-1990s were often
implemented by ‘deconcentrating’ and ‘delegating’
responsibilities to regional and local governments
(Tordoff, 1994; Hirschmann, 2003; Shivji and Peter,
2003; Kessy and McCourt, 2010). Recent reforms which
started in 1998 have been described as more ‘holistic’
and ‘far-reaching’ (URT, 2008a). LGRs are being
implemented under the policy of ‘decentralization by
devolution’ with a goal of restructuring LGAs1
1LGAs in Tanzania are divided into rural and urban
authorities. Rural authorities are district councils and
so that they can respond more effectively and efficiently
to identified local priorities of service delivery (URT, 1996,
1998, 2008a, 2009).
Since then, many studies focusing on different
dimensions of the reforms have been carried out
including those looking at the fiscal aspects (Boex, 2003;
Fjeldstad, 2004; Fjeldstad et al., 2004; Lund, 2007),
political devolution and local democracy (Lange, 2008;
Kessy and McCourt, 2010), and local government
discretion and accountability (Venugopal and Yilmaz,
2010). Few researchers have examined the relationship
between the process of decentralization and its outcomes
on service delivery. Examples include those looking at
the water sector (Jiménez and Pérez-Foguet, 2010a,b;
de Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011) and the health
sector (Mubyazi et al., 2004; Boon, 2007; COWI and
EPOS, 2007; Maluka et al., 2010). Although some of
these studies highlight the types of institutions created by
the reforms to facilitate delivery and management of
township authorities while urban authorities include city,
municipal and town councils.
public services, little attention has been paid to the
interplay between the local level institutional
arrangements and the broader governance structures
based on an analytical framework. Similarly, the
differences and constraints in institutional arrangements
between different sectors have not been fully explored.
To bridge this gap and contribute to the
decentralization literature in Tanzania, this article
examines decentralized service delivery in the sectors of
water and health employing the principal-agent theory to
explain the relations between actors in the institutional
arrangements. The main question is: what are the main
institutional characteristics of the current decentralization
processes with regard to water and health services
delivery, and what are the factors that constrain the
realization of decentralization? The specific questions
are: which institutions are responsible for delivery of
water and health services at the sub-district level; how
are the power relations between and within these
institutions structured; and what are the constraints and
differences between the two sectors?
We define institutions as the “structures of rules,
procedures and organisations whether state provided or
otherwise” (Kimenyi and Meagher, 2004).
Decentralization for service delivery entails restructuring
institutions and/or creating new ones because its
expected outcomes partly depend on institutional
arrangements and their power relations (Azfar et al.,
2004; Batley, 2004; Eaton and Schroeder, 2010; de
Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011). The assumption is
that having the right local institutional framework will
result into better use of resources leading to improved
service delivery (Mubyazi et al., 2004; Cleaver and
Toner, 2006; Ribot et al., 2006). Although
decentralization has mostly been approached as a
sector-neutral process, effective institutional
arrangements for public services delivery could be sector
specific. Hence, it is important to analyse decentralization
not by focusing on one sector only or on local public
services in general. Furthermore, it can be hypothesized
that decentralization processses are gendered, meaning
that they will not equally address men’s and women’s
needs, while this will also differ per sectors. We see
gender as a cross cutting perspective using Moser’s
(1993) distinction between practical and strategic gender
needs. The next section presents the methodology used
in this study.
METHODOLOGY
The present article forms part of a research project on the
‘gender perspectives on the implications of
decentralization reforms on service delivery in rural
Tanzania’ currently being carried out by the first author in
the districts of Kondoa and Kongwa. The article is based
on the information obtained through a desk review of the
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scientific literature, research reports and policy
documents on decentralized service delivery in general,
and Tanzania in particular; semi-structured and
unstructured interviews with district council officials and
village leaders; and analysis of secondary data from
district councils and village leaders. While a major part of
the analysis and discussion relies on the literature review,
some relevant preliminary empirical findings from the field
are also integrated. In the next section, we discuss the
theoretical perspectives on decentralization focusing on
its meaning, potential benefits and limitations for service
delivery, and the principal-agent theory which is the main
analytical framework in this article.
Decentralized service delivery: meaning, rationale
and limitations
Although decentralization has been defined variedly, it is
generally accepted that in the broad sense, it denotes
“the transfer of power and responsibility to plan, make
decisions and manage public functions from higher level
of government to a lower one” (Conyers, 1990:19).
Decentralization deals with the territorial distribution of
power, authority and responsibility for the political, fiscal
and administrative systems between the centre and the
periphery (Brinkerhoff and Azfar, 2010). Crucial questions
are therefore, what powers are transferred and to which
local institutions are they transferred to. The answers to
these questions determine the extent to which local
institutions as recipients of decentralized powers, can
effectively plan and implement development activities
including service provision (Conyers, 1990).
Decentralization is frequently advocated as a means of
improving public services delivery based on the
assumption that in a decentralized system services are
more responsive to local needs and demands of service
users because citizens can directly or indirectly influence
decisions about resource allocation and service delivery
(Rakodi, 2002; Conyers, 2007). Decentralized institutions
are viewed to improve matching of public services to local
needs and preferences and increase accountability of
local governments to their constituencies (World Bank,
2001), resulting in better targeted policies and lower
transaction costs (Ribot et al., 2006). The World Bank
(2004) stresses that decentralization is an institutional
mechanism that has the potential of enhancing the
service users’ voice in a way that leads to improved
services.
Underlying these arguments is the assumption that
decentralization of service delivery occurs within an
institutional environment that provides the political,
administrative and financial authority to local institutions,
along with effective channels for local accountability and
central oversight (World Bank, 2001; Azfar et al., 2004).
According to Conyers (2007), the outcomes of
decentralization depend on the type of public services
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involved, the institutional design, the way it is
implemented, the capacity of institutions involved, and
the wider economic, social and political environment.
Hence, decentralized service delivery requires a mix of
relations between central and local institutions, referred
to as ‘institutional pluralism’ by Blair (2001). However,
many studies indicate that the necessary institutional
arrangements for the desired outcomes are rarely
observed. Most decentralization reforms are either flawed
in their institutional design or central governments do not
decentralise sufficient power and resources to local level
governments to enable them to have significant impact
on local service delivery (Devas and Grant, 2003; Ribot
et al., 2006; Conyers, 2007). The principal-agent theory
discussed in the next section is therefore a valuable
analytical perspective to explain the relations between
the actors within the institutional arrangements.
Decentralization and the principal-agent theory
The principal-agent theory (in the literature also referred
to as agency theory) is one of the dominant theoretical
perspectives for analysing and describing public
governance reforms. Initially used mostly by economists
(e.g. de Groot, 1988; Dixit et al., 1997; Besley and Coate,
2003), it is now widely applied by sociologists, political
scientists and others (Shapiro, 2005; Papenfuß and
Schaefer, 2010). The theory proposes a ‘principal’ with
specific objectives and ‘agents’ who are required to
implement activities to achieve those objectives. The core
of the principal-agent theory is the ‘agency relationship’,
which depends on power positions and information flows
between principals and agents. The question, then, is
how principals can manage the interests of agents so that
they are in line with the goals they (principals) wish to
achieve (Bossert, 1998; Bossert and Beauvais, 2002;
Batley, 2004; Brinkerhoff and Azfar, 2010; Calabrò and
Torchia, 2011).
Hiskey (2010:30) views decentralization, especially
when it takes the form of devolution, as “an alteration of
principal-agent relationships, where principals
theoretically gain more leverage over agents directly
responsible for service provision”. He emphasizes that
analysing decentralization reforms using the principal-
agent perspective helps to explain the trade-offs between
different actors and the changes that decentralization
may bring with them given the new responsibilities of the
actors involved. Mewes (2011) links the theory to top-
down and bottom-up models. In the first, local
governments are agents, exercising responsibilities on
behalf of the central government (principal). In the
bottom-up model, the ultimate principals are the citizens
or service users, while politicians as representatives in
decision-making organs are agents. In turn, local
government administrators responsible for executing
service delivery functions are agents of local political
leaders and service users.
The theory has been criticized for focusing on the
vertical relationship between the centre and periphery in
a ‘one-dimensional’ way, which makes it difficult to
analyse multiple principals and agents, especially if they
are at different administrative levels (Bossert, 1998;
Batley, 2004). However, available evidence shows that
the theory can accommodate multiple agency
relationships (see for example Batley, 2004; Tommasi
and Weinschelbaum, 2007; Calabrò and Torchia, 2011)
or can be modified to address different contexts (Bossert,
1998; Bossert and Mitchell, 2011). For example, Bossert
(1998) introduces the concept of ‘decision space’ to
include various functions and activities over which local
governments have control and the degree of choice they
are allowed by the central government, as well as the
powers actually exercised in practice. The following part
introduces the context of LGRs in Tanzania before
examining the institutional arrangements for water and
health sectors using the principal-agent theory and the
wider decentralization frameworks as analytical tools.
The history of decentralized service delivery in
Tanzania
During the first decade of independence (1961-71), the
local government system inherited from the British
colonial government that was based on a combination of
chiefdoms and locally elected representatives, was
amended into a more inclusive system of representative
local authorities. However, local governments did not
meet the expectations due to limited financial and human
resources, and perception of local governments as
implementing agencies of the central government rather
than representative bodies answering to local needs. In
1972, local governments were abolished and replaced by
a system of deconcentration for a period of ten years. In
1982, local governments were revived and charged with
substantial authority over roads, health, primary
education and water services. But again, they did not
deliver as anticipated because of the tendency to
centralize and concentrate powers in central government
agencies (World Bank, 1999; Hirschmann, 2003; Shivji
and Peter, 2003; URT, 2009; Kessy and McCourt, 2010;
Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010).
As a result of this centralized mode of governance,
delivery of social services to the largely rural population
was mainly the responsibility of central government with
support from donors. The economic crisis of the late
1970s and early 1980s caused deterioration of almost all
social services up to the early 1990s. According to a
World Bank (1999) review, the health sector experienced
critical shortages of basic pharmaceutical and other
medical supplies, inadequate and dissatisfied workers,
and decreased supervision to district and sub-district
health facilities. In the water sector, implementation of the
regional water master plans faltered, leaving communities
with partially constructed wells and pumping systems and
no improved access to water services.
In 1996, a decisive step was taken to reform LGAs2
through a Local Government Reform Program (LGRP)
following the publication of the Local Government Reform
Agenda (URT, 1996) and later the Policy Paper on Local
Government Reform (URT, 1998). LGRP was seen as a
vehicle through which government would promote and
drive the decentralization process. It was envisaged that
through the principle of subsidiarity, service provision
would be brought closer to the users and political powers
devolved to lower levels as far as possible and feasible
(URT, 2008b). In order to create an enabling institutional
and legal framework, LGRs have since then been
incorporated into the Tanzanian Law through the Local
Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act,
No.6 of 1999 which amended the Local Government
(District Authorities) Act No.7 of 1982; the Local
Government Finances Act, No.9 of 1982; the Local
Government Services Act, No.10 of 1982; and the Local
Government Negotiating Machinery Act, No.11 of 1982
(Shivji and Peter, 2003).
LGRs involved four main areas. First, political
devolution of powers by setting up of local democratic
institutions and enhancing public participation in decision-
making processes. Second, fiscal decentralization of
local government finances by introducing equitable and
transparent discretionary and sector-specific grants from
the central government to LGAs, and giving powers to
LGAs to pass their own budgets based on local priorities.
Third, administrative decentralization entailing de-linking
LGA staff from central government line ministries and
integrating them into LGA administration, LGAs recruiting
their own personnel, and local government staff being
accountable to local councils. Fourth, changing of central-
local relations, with the central government having over-
riding powers within the constitutional and legal
framework, and with local governments having devolved
powers and responsibilities in law. The main agency for
coordinating the implementation of service delivery
functions in rural areas is the district council (URT, 1996,
1998, 2008a, 2009). In the next section, we address the
implications of these reforms and institutional
arrangements on water and health services delivery at
the local level.
Rural water supply: A mix of top-down and bottom-up
models
Delivery of rural water services in Tanzania has followed
different approaches from the 1960s, reflecting the
development philosophy and governance approaches
2Initially, the government focused on one third of LGAs
and subsequently all 133 LGAs were incorporated in the
reforms (URT, 2008a).
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adopted. Currently, the national water policy adopted in
2002 is the guiding framework for water services delivery.
This policy is partly framed by LGRs and aims at
Creating a comprehensive institutional and legal
framework with a view of promoting effective institutional
linkages among actors including central government,
LGAs, private sector, NGOs, CBOs and communities
(URT, 2002). As opposed to its 1991 predecessor, which
was based on a ‘supply-driven approach’, the 2002 policy
adopts a ‘demand-responsive approach’ stating that
service users should be responsible for establishing,
owning and managing their water schemes, and ensuring
full cost recovery for operation and maintenance (O and
M). The policy also emphasizes fair representation of
women in village water entities and effective participation
of men and women in rural water supply programs.
The main policy instrument for domestic rural water
supply is the Water Sector Development Program
(WSDP) (formerly called Rural Water Supply and
Sanitation Project), which was launched in 2006. The
main actors in this sector are at three levels: the central
government through the Ministry of Water (MoW) and
Prime Minister’s Office –Regional Administration and
Local Government (PMO-RALG), district councils and
communities (wards and villages). The main
responsibilities of MoW include: design of WSDP
according to national priorities aiming at increasing equity
in water services delivery, funds allocation to LGAs in
collaboration with PMO-RALG and preparation of
guidelines for implementation (de Palencia and Pérez-
Foguet, 2011). In line with the principles of LGRs, the
district council through its water department has the
overall responsibility for the management and
coordination of rural water supply activities including
domestic water, water for livestock, irrigation and
sanitation. It is the focal point for decentralized
implementation responsible for promoting demand at
village level, planning, providing support and monitoring
the implementation of community projects.
However, interviews with district council officials
revealed that district councils have weak financial and
technical capacity to undertake their decentralized
mandates. Budget allocations for WSDP are not
proportional with demand for services and approved
budgets are not timely disbursed to LGAs. In 2010/11 for
example, Kondoa district planned to drill 27 boreholes but
only 19 were approved by MoW. Further, funds and
permits to engage contractors were released by MoW in
June, the last month of the financial year compelling the
district to implement these interventions in the next
financial year. Information obtained from district water
departments shows that both districts face shortages of
staff with Kongwa having only 22% of the required staff in
the water department and Kondoa 50%. Weak technical,
administrative and financial capacities in LGAs have
been cited as major obstacles to efficient and effective
service delivery and in some cases used as justifications
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for recentralization (Devas and Grant, 2003; Rondinelli,
2006).
The district council is also responsible for the selection
of beneficiary villages based on lack of access to water
services, the amount of cash contributed by villagers,
presence of village water committee, and vulnerability to
diseases. These criteria have to be discussed with ward
councillors and decided on full council meetings. Our
interviews with district council officials and village leaders
revealed that to qualify for WSDP projects, villages have
to raise five percent of the total initial costs for drilling,
pump and engine installation, and water distribution, and
that the actual amount differs between villages depending
on the depth of the borehole and the length of the
distribution network. Jiménez and Pérez-Foguet (2010b)
are concerned that the demand-driven approach
advocated in policy has been narrowly interpreted to
imply cash and labour contribution with no consideration
of other indicators. Vulnerability to diseases and lack of
access to water supply services are not rigorously
applied as selection criteria for WSDP projects. This puts
women with their practical gender needs for access to
sufficient and safe water at a disadvantage.
At village level, communities are expected to initiate
demand for improvement of facilities by using the
opportunities and obstacles to development (O and OD)
planning process (Jiménez and Pérez-Foguet, 2010b; de
Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011). Although village
planning is a well-established and inclusive process that
allows villagers to identify their needs and priorities
(Cooksey and Kikula, 2005), it appears that the process
is limited in scope and quality. Village plans are
influenced by national priorities and directives, and local
priorities sometimes change if budgets exceed available
funds. Moreover, the current funding mechanisms do not
feed into village priorities because village plans are rarely
used as sources of information for selection of villages to
benefit from WSDP. Thus, the link between inputs from
village participatory planning processes and district plans
and bugdets is generally blurred (Venugopal and Yilmaz,
2010; de Palencia and Pérez-Foguet, 2011).
Seeing this from the principal-agent perspective,
delivery of rural water services is compounded with
multiple agency relationships exhibiting both top-down
and bottom-up models. In the top-down model, the
central government is the ‘principal’ with the objective of
improving water services delivery and LGAs are the
‘agents’ charged with responsibilities for delivering the
services. LGAs have some degree of autonomy and
‘decision space’ where they can plan and implement a
range of water supply interventions, but the centre
shapes most LGAs’ decisions through conditions for
intergovernmental transfers, guidelines and directives.
Although policy documents stipulate that Tanzania is
implementing “decentralization by devolution” (URT,
1996, 1998, 2008a, 2009), actual implementation on the
ground is more inclined towards deconcentration and
delegation, and less towards devolution (cf. Brinkerhoff
and Azfar, 2010).
In the bottom-up model, villagers (the service users)
and councillors are the principals, and district council
administrators are the agents. It was learnt from
interviews with village leaders that villagers exercise their
agency as principals during survey and final selection of
sites to drill boreholes using their indigenous knowledge
in addition to the technical expertise of surveyors, in
electing village water committees and in setting water
user fees and payment modalities for O and M, which is
an indication of decentralization moving towards the
devolutionary end. However, the agency of councillors as
principals does not appear to work effectively because
technical staff often have more power and influence than
councillors in planning, budgeting and personell
management (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). This reflects
power inequality between lower level principals and
higher level agents who in practice deny the agency of
their principals. Batley (2004) refers to this as the ‘agency
problem’ where agents have limited incentives to serve
the goals of their principals.
Adopting the principles of managing water resources at
the ‘lowest appropriate level’ as stipulated by the water
policy has also meant the creation and/or strengthening
of village water committees, water user groups and water
user associations to own, manage, operate and maintain
water supply systems on behalf of communities (URT,
2002, 2008c; Cleaver and Toner, 2006). Preliminary
observations from the field show most of the villages
manage their water sources through village water
committees and few use private operators. It was
observed that the proportion of women in village water
committees ranges from 20% to 56% indicating some
variations on how national policies like decentralization
are interpreted and implemented in different local
settings. Whether their members represent service users’
interests is questionable. While equal representation of
women in water committees could be expected to
contribute to gender equity and address strategic gender
needs if the bottom-up model were working, the current
situation suggests that women representation does not
help much, since these committees are in fact agents,
and hence, representation is at the agent level rather
than at the principal level.
Health services delivery: The limits to
decentralization
The health sector was one of the pioneers of
decentralized service delivery through health sector
reforms (HSRs) starting from the early 1990s aiming at
improving the quality of health services provided to
communities (URT, 2003; Maluka et al., 2010). Delivery
of public health care services is organised at three
administrative levels. At the centre is the Ministry of
Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) responsible for
development of sectoral policy and the regulatory
framework, monitoring and evaluation in collaboration
with PMO-RALG. At the regional level, the Regional
Medical Officer forms part of the Regional Secretariat
and is responsible for providing supervisory and technical
support to LGAs (Tidermand et al., 2008). In accordance
with HSRs and LGRs, district councils are responsible for
running district hospitals, health centres and dispensaries
using subventions from central government and locally
generated resources. Voluntary agencies, faith based
organisations (FBOs) and the private sector provide
health services through contractual agreements with
district councils (URT, 2003). A number of studies show
that, there is significant progress in decentralizing
planning, budgeting and management of health services
to LGAs. District councils have some autonomy over a
wide range of health related matters and institutional
bodies are in place in almost all districts (Mubyazi et al.,
2004; COWI and EPOS, 2007; Yoshida, 2008;
Tidermand et al., 2008; Maluka et al., 2010).
There has been an increase in resource allocation to
district councils through central government transfers with
around 29% of their total expenditures going to the health
sector (COWI and EPOS, 2007; Maluka et al., 2010).
Although central government oversight is necessary in
ensuring that LGAs use financial and other resources in
an efficient, effective and transparent way (World Bank,
2001; Azfar et al., 2004), LGAs’ authority to plan and
allocate funds according to their needs is constrained.
Most financial transfers are controlled by the centre
through budget ceilings, guidelines and approvals. In
addition, services have to comply with national priorities,
and the centre can withhold funds if it is not satisfied with
LGA’s performance (COWI and EPOS, 2007; Tidermand
et al., 2008). This shows a principal-agent problem where
the central government (principal) exercises more power
on LGAs (the agents). As others have argued, this
problem is characteristic of many developing countries
where in most cases local institutions are given power to
make decisions but not the control over resources
needed to implement those decisions (Ribot, 2002;
Conyers, 2007). This suggests that decentralization in the
health sector is more dominated by the top-down model,
and takes the forms of deconcentration and delegation
(cf. Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; Litvack et al., 1998).
Before the current reforms, management and
administration of health services was the exclusive
responsibility of the central government. At the district
level, the district medical officer (DMO), the overall in-
charge of medical services in the district was directly
accountable to MoHSW. In the current set up, DMOs and
other health personnel are employees of the district
council, administratively reporting to the DED and to
MoHSW on technical matters. But because of persistent
recruitment problems at the district and lower levels
especially in the remote and poorer areas, human
Masanyiwa et al. 82
resource recruitment has been recentralized. URT
(2009:7) identifies “the apparent reluctance by central
government to devolve autonomy for human resource
management to LGAs” as one of the bottlenecks in
implementing decentralization by devolution, which can
be viewed as a principal-agent problem. Shortage of
skilled staff, inequitable distribution of the existing
workforce with a tendency for more health workers per
population in urban than in rural and less advantaged
areas, and bureaucratic recruitment processes stand as
major challenges in human resources for health (COWI
and EPOS, 2007; Tidermand et al., 2008). Information
obtained from DMOs in both districts shows that health
centres and dispensaries which are rural based are
seriously understaffed as reflected by deficits of 70% and
60% of required health personnel in Kondoa and 60%
and 49% in Kongwa in their health centres and
dispensaries, respectively. Certainly, difficulties of
recruiting and retaining skilled staff at district level and
below is a widely recognised constraint (Francis and
James, 2003).
Another important initiative in the reform process has
been the establishment of institutional bodies for
governance, planning, budgeting, implementation and
monitoring of local services. As shown in Table 1, various
committees and service boards as centrally determined
by MoHSW and PMO-RALG have been established at all
levels. With the exception of the Council Health
Management Teams (CHMTs), which are composed of
health staff only (agents), all others have mixed
membership, involving both principals and agents. In
theory, service boards and committees have the potential
to strengthen the voice of users and responsiveness of
service providers and make politicians and policy-makers
more accountable to service users (Ribot, 2002; Boon,
2007) i.e. the devolutionary end on the “decentralization
continuum” (cf. Brinkerhoff and Azfar, 2010). However,
the state of affairs on the ground may differ. Citing an
example of the Council Health Service Boards (CHSBs),
COWI and EPOS (2007) explain that despite their well
elaborate roles and functions, most of them are not
functioning properly and meet infrequently. This implies
that council comprehensive health plans (CCHPs), the
main planning framework for health interventions in
LGAs, are mostly prepared by CHMT members (agents)
with little or no involvement of CHSBs. Boon (2007)
shows that selection of CHSB members is dominated by
the government and that community representatives have
no forum for consultation with their constituencies and
have weak decision making powers. According to
Conyers (2007), the effectiveness of management and
user committees depends on their structure, composition,
motivation and capacity of their members; and how they
are linked to the local and national structures. In this
case, the presence of committees and service boards
does not appear to alter the existing power relations
between lower level principals (service users and
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 Four community service users of whom at least
two are women
 One representative from a voluntary agency
providing services in the area
 One representative from private sector providing
services in the area
 The chairman of the council social services
committee
 District planning officer
 District medical officer (secretary)
 One representative of the regional health
management team
 Ensure that the population receives appropriate and
affordable health care services
 Discuss and approve health plans, budgets and
reports from CHMT and submit to the Full Council
for approval
 Support CHMT in managing and administering
health resources





 District medical officer
 District health secretary
 District health officer
 District nursing officer
 District pharmacist
 District medical laboratory technologist
 District dental surgeon
 Prepare district comprehensive health plans
 Ensure that health services are implemented as per
comprehensive health plans
 Carry out supportive supervision to health staff at all
levels in the district
 Ensure data collection, analysis, utilization and
feedback mechanisms by health workers





 Three community representatives appointed
from service users
 Two members appointed from the health centre
committee and dispensary committee
 One person appointed from voluntary agencies
providing health services in the district
 One person appointed from private sector
providing health services in the district
 One member of the CHSB
 District medical officer
 One representative of the MoHSW
 Oversee management of resources at the hospital
 Discuss and pass proposals and budgets for the
hospital and submit to the council through CHSB
 Identify, mobilize and solicit financial resources for
the financing of the hospital services
 Receive and discuss implementation reports from
hospital management team
 Provide feedback to the community about hospital




 One person appointed from private sector
providing health services in the area
 The officer in-charge of the health centre
(secretary)
 Three persons appointed from community
members receiving services from the health
centre
 One member from dispensary committees
 One member from ward development
committees (WDC)
 Receive and discuss implementation reports
prepared by the Health Centre Management Team
 Identify and solicit financial resources for the
running of health centre services
 Advise and recommend to the CHSB on matters
related to human resources development
 Overseer the availability of essential supplies of




 Ward executive officer
 One head teacher of a primary school within the
ward
 Two community members of whom one is a
female
 Clinical officer in charge of a health care facility
within the ward
 One representative from community based
organisations
 One representative from the WDC
 Initiate and coordinate comprehensive community
health plans
 Monitor level of contributions and user-fee revenues
 Mobilize community members to join the community
health fund (CHF)
 Organise general meetings of members of CHF








 Three members from dispensary users
 One representative from a private health facility
 One representative from a voluntary health
facility
 One representative of WDC
 One representative of village council
 In-charge of dispensary (secretary)
 Discuss and pass dispensary plans and budgets
 Identify and solicit funds
 Assist Dispensary Management team in planning
and managing community based initiatives
 Ensure the delivery of appropriate services
Source: Adapted from URT (2001); Maluka et al. (2010).
representatives in the committees) and higher level
agents (technical district staff).
At sub-district level, studies show that establishment of
health facility committees (HFCs) did had a positive
impact on participation of communities in managing
health facilities, even though planning of health delivery
targets and priorities, still largely remains under the
control of the centre (Mubyazi et al., 2004; Tidermand et
al., 2008; Maluka et al., 2010). The multiplicity of
committees (multiple agents) is however, a challenge at
the ward and village level. COWI and EPOS (2007)
question the necessity of creating special governing
committees for each health facility when village and ward
health committees which are linked to local government
structures are in place and functioning. This arrangement
is seen as diluting the relationship between health
facilities and local government authorities. In principal-
agent terms, this shows ‘multiple agents’ at the same
administrative level with each trying to exercise power
and control over the other, resulting in tensions and
conflicts.
The current situation also raises the question of LGAs
responsiveness to local needs. The health policy
emphasizes community involvement and ownership
through active participation in identification of problem
areas, planning, implementation, monitoring and
evaluation of health care services (URT, 2003). However,
a study by Mubyazi et al. (2004) in Babati, Lushoto,
Muheza and Mkuranga districts reports that, ward and
village leaders commonly complained about the failure of
district authorities to respond to local priorities citing
some diseases which were perceived by community
members as major health problems in their respective
areas but were not reflected or were given low priority in
district plans. Tidermand et al., (2008) arrived at almost a
similar conclusion, observing that community involvement
in health planning and delivery is very minimal because
many district health plans do not reflect identified
community needs through the bottom-up O and OD
planning process that is supposed to be the basis for
district plans.
This suggests that, LGAs are to a large extent still
“implementers of national and sectoral development
programmes” with little reference to local priorities (URT,
2009:7). Crook (2003) demonstrates with evidence from
Ghana, Code d’Ivoire, Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe
that even where democratic representation mechanisms
exist, local governments have not been responsive to
local needs and community aspirations are mostly
ignored in drawing up district plans. This conclusion
should however be taken with caution, considering the
nature of the health sector. For example, discussions with
district council officials revealed that, village plans mostly
focus on curative and not preventive health services, and
do not reflect gender issues. This compels district council
officials to harmonize village plans to include other
national priorities for which funds are available.
Water and health services: Does sector make a
difference?
It is apparent from the above analysis that there have
been significant efforts to decentralize the institutional
arrangements in both sectors, although the effectiveness
of the decentralised structures leaves much to be done.
Decentralization theory argues that services should be
decentralized if demand and supply conditions are highly
localised (Andrews and Schroeder, 2003). While both
sectors are prime candidates for decentralization, they
differ in a number of ways. Rural water supply requires
substantial infrastructure investments along with
operating and maintenance inputs, its users are defined
territorially and can organize themselves on that basis.
This localised nature of the service provides a justification
for decentralizing organisation, implementation and O
and M. Under the on-going reforms the central
government has changed its role from an implementer
and manager to facilitator and regulator, and encouraged
community participation in rural water supply schemes,
displaying both bottom-up and top-down models. By
contrast, primary health care is provided through a
vertically integrated chain of service delivery units which
is produced by combining skilled health staff, non-
recurrent resources and infrastructure, and involves
benefits and risks that extend beyond local jurisdictions.
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Clients also use the service while in a state of crisis and
vulnerability, and information asymmetry limits their
choice (Batley, 2004). Therefore, decentralization of
primary health care services requires more central
government involvement especially with regard to
financing, allocation of expertise and coordination. The
current situation in Tanzania shows that the health sector
has a more hierarchical institutional set-up from the
lowest village level up the ladder to the centre with more
orientation towards the top-down model, which could also
be viewed as decentralization in the forms of
deconcentration or delegation.
Decentralization in the two sectors also shows some
similar constraints. Fiscal decentralization as a
supporting strategy to service delivery functions has
evolved in both sectors. Intergovernmental transfers from
central government to LGAs have been institutionalised
and are the major sources of local government financial
resources. Despite the increased proportion of resources
spent at the local level, LGAs are highly dependent on
central government grants with limited capacity to raise
their own local revenue. Experience from other African
countries shows that central governments use their fiscal
strength to influence provision and production decisions
at the local level (Andrews and Schroeder, 2003). In both
sectors, poor community involvement in planning and
integration of local needs into district plans contests the
widely held notion that ‘decentralization brings
government and services closer to people’. Generally,
there are discrepancies between the decentralized
structures as they appear in policy and what is actually
happening in practice. The changes in institutional
arrangements have not matched with changes in the
processes, rules and attitudes of technical and
administrative staff that would enable the newly created
structures to operate with greater autonomy to achieve
‘decentralization by devolution’. Whereas the role of
central government is in principle supposed to be limited
to policy making, regulation, monitoring and quality
assurance, or ‘eyes on’ and ‘hands off’ (URT, 1998;
2008a; 2009), in practice there is a high degree of central
government involvement in LGAs’ affairs (Kessy and
McCourt, 2010; Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010). This
reflects what Blair (2001:120) refers to as ‘distributed
institutional monopoly’ where the central government
decentralizes authority and responsibility for certain
functions, but maintains a hierarchical state control in the
form of deconcentration or delegation.
CONCLUSION
The main impression gained from this review is that water
and health sectors present different institutional
arrangements and spaces for the exercise of control
between multiple principals and agents. The nature of
sector plays an important role in the institutional
arrangements for decentralized service delivery because
it determines which functions to decentralize and which
ones to centralize. Different forms of decentralization are
being used simultaneously though with varying degrees
depending on the nature of sector. This has also created
some principal-agent problems, thus limiting LGAs’
autonomy to exercise their decentralised service delivery
functions. The evidence from this review therefore raises
a number of issues for further investigation. For example,
using a gender lens is crucial to assess from the users’
perspectives the extent to which the delivery of
appropriate water and health services to rural households
has improved after the reforms. The lens is also
important to assess how gender roles and needs are
reflected in the decision-making processes regarding
service delivery, and how different community groups
participate in decision-making and whether
decentralization reforms have enlarged their opportunities
for participation.
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APPENDIX 1:
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CBOs - Community Based Organisations
CCHP - Comprehensive Council Health Plan
CHMT - Council Health Management Team
CHSB - Council Health Service Boards
DED - District Executive Director
DED - District Executive Director
DMO - District Medical Officer
FBO - Faith Based Organisation
HFCs - Health Facility Committees
HSRs - Health Sector Reforms
LGAs - Local Government Authorities
LGRP - Local Government Reform Program
LGRs - Local Government Reforms
MoHSW - Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
MoW - Ministry of Water
NGOs - Non-Governmental Organisations
O&M - Operations and Maintenance
O&OD - Opportunities and Obstacles to Development
PMO-RALG - Prime Ministers’ Office – Regional Administration and Local Government
URT - United Republic of Tanzania
WDC - Ward Development Committee
WSDP - Water Sector Development Program
